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Privatisation, consolidation and the  




This paper discusses three major structural changes - privatisation, consolidation and an increased 
role of foreign banks - that have been taking place in banking systems of emerging market economies, 
focusing on the period since 2000. It assesses, on the basis of standard indicators, how far the 
banking systems studied have increased intermediation efficiency as a result of these changes. In this 
regard the paper looks at both the productive efficiency of the banking industry itself and some 
aspects of allocative efficiency, focusing on changes in the composition of lending to different sectors 
of the economy. The issues of dynamic efficiency - the impact of changes in banking systems on 
economic growth and financial stability - are not discussed. The paper also identifies some challenges 
that the evolving banking structure might create for market discipline and supervisory oversight. 
When these issues were last discussed at a meeting of deputy governors in 2000, many emerging 
market economies were still recovering from financial crises of the second half of the 1990s (Hawkins 
and Mihaljek (2001)). Deregulation of financial services at the national level and opening-up to 
international competition were just beginning. Although privatisation was well advanced in central 
Europe and Latin America, many state-owned banks in these regions as well as Asia had yet to be 
privatised. The global financial industry was in the midst of an unprecedented boom in the use of 
information technology. Changes in corporate behaviour such as the growing use of debt markets and 
increased emphasis on shareholder value were also beginning to spread worldwide.  
Changes in the structure of the banking industry that have taken place over the past five years are 
important but perhaps less spectacular than what was expected in December 2000. Trends in 
privatisation, consolidation and the increased role of foreign-owned banks have continued, but the 
banking systems in many countries - particularly large Asian economies - have yet to be integrated 
fully with the global financial system. Improvements in the efficiency of intermediation have been more 
uniform, suggesting that benefits to industry and consumers from greater competitive pressure in 
banking have been widespread. But questions continue to be raised about the effectiveness of 
banking systems in Asian countries with high saving rates in steering funds towards the most 
productive uses from the global economy perspective (Bernanke (2005), Clarida (2005)). Banks in 
many Asian and central European economies have shifted lending from the public sector and 
corporations towards households and smaller firms, but in some Latin American countries the share of 
bank credit to the government has actually increased.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 reviews broad changes in the structure of banking 
systems in emerging market countries since 2000, focusing on trends in privatisation and bank 
consolidation. Section 2 looks at the effects of these changes on the composition of bank lending and 
on bank efficiency. Section 3 concludes with a discussion of some policy challenges facing central 
banks and supervisory authorities in this new environment. 
1.  Structural changes in the banking sector since 2000 
Structure of the banking system  
Two main elements of the structure of banking systems that are considered in this section are the 
degree of government versus private domestic or foreign ownership of banks, and trends in 
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consolidation in the banking industry. There is a large literature on benefits and costs associated with 
privatisation and foreign ownership of banks in emerging market economies.
2 In general, studies 
suggest that productive, allocative and dynamic efficiency tend to be lower in banking systems 
dominated by state-owned banks, while privatisation and an increased role of foreign banks helps to 
improve at least some aspects of efficiency. There has been less research on bank consolidation in 
emerging market economies, partly because the relevant problem in many banking systems is excess 
fragmentation rather than excess concentration (see below). Research on industrial countries 
suggests that concentration in banking plays a more complex role than would be suggested for 
traditional industries such as manufacturing and trade. 
Commercial banks retain a dominant role in providing credit in emerging market economies (see the 
paper by Mohanty et al in this volume). Outside Latin America and a few Asian economies, non-bank 
financial institutions supply negligible amounts of aggregate credit.
3 Within the banking sector, 
commercial banks provide on average 90% of total credit. This share has actually increased over the 
past five years, in particular in Latin America, but also in some crisis-hit countries in Asia, where many 
fringe financial intermediaries have collapsed. Deposit-taking institutions other than commercial banks 
play a more important role only in Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, where they supply roughly a quarter 
of total credit. 
Changes in the ownership structure of banks have been more significant. As indicated in Graph 1, the 
share of state-owned commercial banks in total bank credit has declined or remained stable in all 
emerging market regions since 1999.
4 Except in China, India and Indonesia, state-owned banks are 
no longer major providers of credit to the economy. The declining role of state-owned banks has been 
particularly pronounced in central Europe, where bank privatisations have essentially been completed. 
Graph 1 
Commercial banks by type of ownership 
Share in total bank credit, in per cent 
 
Source: National data (BIS questionnaire). 
                                                       
2   See, for example, the review article by Barth et al (2004). 
3   Unless otherwise indicated, the country groupings used in this paper are as follows: Latin America (Chile, Colombia, Mexico 
and Venezuela); other Asia (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand); central Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland); and other emerging market economies (Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey).  
4   The small increase in the share of state-owned banks in total credit in other Asia in 2004 is due entirely to Indonesia, where 
the majority of commercial banks that failed during the 1999 crisis were nationalised and subsequently gradually privatised. 
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There have also been major shifts in the relative importance of domestic and foreign private banks. 
Continuing a trend that was observed five years ago, since 1999 the share of private domestic banks 
has declined in Latin America and central Europe (to 60% and 13% of total bank credit, respectively) 
while that of foreign-owned banks has increased significantly. But in some Asian countries (Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand) and other emerging market economies (Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey), 
there has been no further penetration of foreign-owned banks since 1999. 
In terms of total assets, the share of foreign ownership ranges from nil in Saudi Arabia to 96% in the 
Czech Republic. The share is higher in central Europe and Latin America, and lower in Asia, Israel, 
Saudi Arabia and Turkey; it also tends to be higher in smaller economies than in larger ones. Upper 
middle income countries (eg Chile, Hungary, Mexico, Malaysia and Poland) tend to have a higher 
proportion of foreign ownership of bank assets. Interestingly, foreign banks own about the same 
percentage of bank assets in many high-income economies (eg Israel and Korea) as in lower-income 
economies (eg India and Indonesia). Overall, these comparisons do not reveal a simple relationship 
between country characteristics and degree of foreign ownership of banking assets. 
Table 1 provides some preliminary evidence on the extent of bank consolidation. Since 1999, the 
number of commercial banks has increased only in China, Saudi Arabia and Colombia, while in other 
economies mergers, acquisitions and liquidations have resulted in a decrease in the number of banks 
ranging from 10 to 30%. Graph A1 in the Appendix reveals another common pattern: after an initial 
increase - for instance, in Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, the Czech Republic and Poland during the first 
half of the 1990s - the number of commercial banks has subsequently retrenched. The number of 
bank branches has also decreased in most countries over the past five years; large expansions in 
branch networks have taken place only in Chile, Colombia and Malaysia. As indicated in the second 
column of Table 1, bank consolidation had already started in the mid-1990s, but at that time the 
branch network was still growing in most countries, in particular in Asia and Latin America. With few 
exceptions, this has also resulted in a decrease in the number of bank employees per branch 
(Graph  2). Given that economies in the sample differ widely in terms of market size and level of 
financial development, it is hard to generalise about the future direction of change in banking density. 
Table 1 
Number of commercial banks and branches
1 
1990-94 1994-99  1999-2004 
Country Banks  Branches  Country Banks  Branches Country Banks  Branches
Czech Rep  511  –41  Thailand  17  35  China  92  … 
Hong Kong SAR  132  …  Mexico  13  60  Saudi Arabia  20  2 
Indonesia 43  22  Singapore  8  35  Colombia 13  20 
Colombia 19  …  Venezuela 8  18  Chile  –10  10 
Saudi Arabia  0  18  Hungary   –2  …  Thailand  –12  2 
Thailand –3  …  Poland  –6  –16  India  –13  4 
Singapore –6  12  Malaysia  –8  47  Hungary –15  –3 
Chile –8  23  Israel  –13  –2  Venezuela  –17  2 
Turkey –8  –7  Korea  –17  44  Czech  Rep  –17  –11 
Venezuela –10  24  Saudi  Arabia  –17 –2  Korea  –19 –5 
Malaysia …  29  Chile  –19  15  Singapore  –19  –38 
     Turkey  –19  14  Argentina  –20  –12 
     Colombia  –23  –3  Indonesia  –21  –5 
     Czech  Rep  –24  …  Mexico  –21  –3 
      Hong Kong SAR –25  2  Israel  –23  –10 
     Indonesia  –33  3  Turkey  –23  –11 
            Hong Kong SAR  –27  –17 
          Malaysia  –29  11 
          Poland  –30  –16 
1  Change in the number of commercial banks/bank branches during period, in per cent. 
Source: National data (BIS questionnaire). 44  BIS Papers No 28
In sum, banking systems in emerging market economies have generally continued to evolve towards 
more private and foreign-owned structures, with fewer commercial banks and often smaller numbers 
of bank branches. As discussed below, in some countries these trends have been the result of post-
crisis weeding-out of weak financial institutions, and mergers encouraged by the authorities under 
financial sector “master plans” (eg in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand). Elsewhere, these 
developments have been mostly market-driven (eg central Europe, Mexico). However, the pace of 
structural change has slowed compared with the second half of the 1990s. Three main reasons come 
to mind: first, banking crises have been less widespread - Argentina’s and Turkey’s crises being the 
only major ones after 2001. Second, the transition towards market-based systems had been largely 
completed in central Europe by the early 2000s. And third, in the favourable macroeconomic and 
financial environment that has prevailed over the past five years there has been less urgency to reform 
banking systems. 
Graph 2 














  Source: National data (BIS questionnaire). 
Privatisation  
Since 2000 there have been 51 partial or full privatisations in the 19 emerging market countries 
studied in this paper (Table 2). The major privatisations took place in Indonesia, Korea, Thailand and 
central Europe. In Indonesia, 15 banks accounting for 70% of total banking sector assets were sold in 
initial public offerings by the bank restructuring agency between 2000 and 2004. The Korean 
authorities privatised four banks nationalised during the 1997-98 crisis, representing 18% of total 
banking sector assets at the time of privatisation (see the paper by the Bank of Korea in this volume). 
In Thailand, the authorities reduced their shareholdings in three out of five major domestic banks taken 
over by the Financial Institutions Development Fund during the 1997 crisis. The government still 
retains large holdings in three major domestic banks - including Krung Thai Bank, one of the largest in 
the country - and is waiting for favourable market conditions to sell these stakes.  
Privatisations have largely been completed in the Czech Republic and Hungary, but have yet to run 
their course in Poland. In the Czech Republic, the government sold holdings in two major banks 
(accounting for 38% of total banking sector assets in 2001) to strategic foreign investors in 2000-01. In 
Hungary, three smaller banks with a combined market share of 7% were sold in 2003. In both 
countries, government ownership is now restricted to special purpose institutions which provide 
support to exporters, small firms and municipalities (Czech Republic), or were set up to develop the 
mortgage bond market (Hungary). In Poland, the government sold 30% of shares in the country’s 
largest retail bank, PKO BP, at the Warsaw Stock Exchange in late 2004. However, the government 



















































































































2004BIS Papers No 28  45
 
Table 2 
Commercial bank privatisations, 2000-05 
Country  Number and main characteristics 
of privatised banks  Guarantees extended  Residual state ownership 
Colombia  0 But privatisations initiated for 
2 banks intervened in late 1990s 
Yes  In the past; depos-
itors, employees’ 
pensions 
3 banks acquired during 
crisis in late 1990s 
Mexico   2 smaller banks intervened in 1999 
auctioned off in 2000 and 2001  
Yes Assets  not 
adequately valued; 
hidden liabilities 
None; minority holdings in 
previous privatisations  
Venezuela   0 Privatisations were carried out 
during 1992-98  
    2 state-owned banks; no 
privatisation plans 
1 failed bank taken into state 
ownership in 2000 
China  14 joint stock commercial banks 
sold shares to foreign investors. 
No plans to initiate widespread 
privatisation, but shares of 2 state 
banks to be sold in public offerings 
Yes Implicit  guarantees 
to depositors 
Majority state holding of 
shares in all major banks; 
plans to reduce 
shareholdings in the long run 
India  0       28 public sector banks; 
government shareholding 
cannot fall below 51% 
Singapore 0      Less  than  ⅓ shareholding in 
former development bank 
Indonesia  15 banks, accounting for 70% of 
total assets, sold in IPOs 
Yes Guarantees  to 
depositors; 
gradually reduced 
Minority ownership in a 
number of banks; to be sold 
Korea  4 banks nationalised during 1997-98 
crisis sold through private 
placement, tender and auction 
Yes  Deposits; bad loans; 
contingent liabilities 
(subject to limit; 
none in some cases) 
Plan to sell 32% in one major 
bank; privatise holding 
company with 4 state bank 
subsidiaries 
Thailand  3 large banks out of 5 taken over 
during 1997-98 crisis sold 
through public offering to 




Holdings (incl majority) in 
3 major banks, waiting for 
market opportunity to sell  
Czech 
Republic 
2 major banks (38% of total 
assets) sold in 2000-01 through 
tender to strategic foreign 
investors 
Yes Impaired  assets 
guaranteed or trans-
ferred to a special 
purpose entity 
2 special purpose banks 
(state support of exporters, 
small firms, municipalities) 
Hungary  3 banks (7% of total assets) sold 
through public offerings, tender 
or auction  
Yes Impaired  assets; 
contingent liabilities 
Residual shares in several 
banks (mostly small); full 
share in mortgage bank 
Poland  5 banks with majority or minority 
state ownership were partially 




(2-3 years) as part 
of privatisations 
1 fully owned state bank; 
1 major and 3 smaller banks 
with majority share; 8 banks 
with minority share 
Russia  1 bank set up in 1993 to imple-
ment priority investment projects 
    State ownership in banking 
sector remains dominant  
Turkey  0 Initiated restructuring ahead of 
privatisation of 2 major banks 
    12 banks taken over during 
2001 crisis; 11 since sold, 
merged or liquidated 
Israel  2 One small bank privatised; one 
major bank (16% of total assets) 
currently being privatised 
No    Plans to privatise major 




0 Partial privatisations in 1980s 
and 1990s of banks rescued 
during the 1960s crisis 
    Shareholdings of 10-80% in 
4 out of 11 domestic banks; 
held largely by 3 govt funds 
as passive investors 
Note: There were no privatisations in Chile, Hong Kong SAR or the Philippines.  
Source: Central bank answers to BIS questionnaire. 46  BIS Papers No 28
Elsewhere, progress in privatisation has been mixed. The authorities in China are focusing on four 
large state-owned banks, which control 60% of the market. The goal is to diversify their ownership 
rather than privatise the banks. Since 2003, three state-owned banks have become joint stock 
companies in preparation for partial privatisation. The authorities have exposed their non-performing 
loans and allowed foreign strategic investors to buy shares. Bank of Construction has been listed on 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, while Industrial Bank and Bank of China could be listed in 2006. As 
with the large state-owned banks, one goal of reform with respect to other joint stock banks with part 
local government, part private ownership is to expand foreign ownership and participation in 
management. Presently, 17 joint stock banks have 22 foreign strategic investors and a large number 
of foreign professionals work in these banks (see the contribution by The People’s Bank of China in 
this volume). Another important area for China is cooperative banks. As 60% of the population lives 
from agriculture, China has over 30,000 credit cooperatives. The government has invested large sums 
of money in restructuring with a view to ensuring that cooperative banks become profitable, 
commercially oriented and founded on mixed ownership. 
In India, no state-owned commercial bank has been privatised since 2000, nor are there any plans for 
divesting government shareholdings. India’s 28 public sector banks account for 80% of total 
commercial bank credit and by law the government’s shareholding in these banks cannot fall below 
51%. There is a new roadmap for opening up the banking sector which envisages a greater role for 
foreign banks after 2009, by which time the consolidation process of domestic banks is expected to be 
completed. 
Russia privatised one state-owned bank in the period under review, in June 2005. The government’s 
strategy for the banking sector does not set out any significant steps to reduce the dominance of state-
owned banks (Lohmus and Teo (2005)). Russia’s largest bank, Sberbank, accounts for 28% of total 
banking sector assets, 42% of total deposits and 30% of credit to the economy. The gradual decline in 
Sberbank’s dominance - its share in total household deposits declined from 75% in 2000 to 60% in 
2004 - has been offset by the expansion of other state-controlled banks.  
The Turkish authorities have initiated restructuring of two state banks which they plan to privatise in 
2006. The only privatisations in the four Latin American countries for which data are available are 
those of two smaller banks in Mexico, which were acquired during rescues in 1999. 
As in the 1990s, the primary motive for privatisations over the past five years has been to sell the 
stakes held by the government to investors with the skills and experience necessary to complete the 
restructuring of banks and transform them into viable business-oriented organisations. More 
specifically, governments of emerging market economies have generally wanted to strengthen banks’ 
capital and overall stability, increase their profitability and competitiveness, broaden the range of 
products and services offered and increase the overall efficiency of financial intermediation. 
Considering the huge fiscal costs of banking crises in the 1990s, many governments also wanted to 
limit the size of any potential future intervention in the banking system. 
Regarding privatisation methods, in the late 1990s impaired assets of many banks nationalised during 
the crisis in Asia were disposed of by asset management companies, while in central Europe and Latin 
America state-owned banks were often sold to strategic foreign investors. By contrast, during 2000-04 
several different methods were used, including the sale of shares through initial and subsequent public 
offerings; sale of shares through tender or auction; and, in some cases, sale of shares through private 
placement, often to strategic investors. These changes in privatisation methods have reflected 
normalisation of the banking industry after the crises and, in central and eastern Europe, the 
completion of the systemic transformation towards a market-based economy in the late 1990s. 
So far, there have been no comprehensive analyses of net costs of bank rescues and privatisations for 
taxpayers.
5 Cost-benefit considerations seem to be largely absent when banks are rescued during 
systemic crises. Limited evidence from individual bank cases suggests that, even under the best of 
circumstances - a rescue quickly followed by successful privatisation - the net costs are very large, 
which perhaps explains why governments prefer not to know exactly how much money taxpayers lose 
when the state restructures and recapitalises distressed banks before selling them to new owners.
6 
                                                       
5   On aggregate costs of banking crises see eg Honohan and Klingebiel (2001) and Sherif (2004).  
6   One well documented case is the rescue of Hungary’s Postabank in 2000. The rescue cost the state around HUF 150 billion 
(about EUR 580 million), and the bank was sold for HUF 100 billion at end-2003, implying a net loss of 33%. Another 
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Several central banks observed in this context that recapitalisation rarely solved banks’ problems, but 
many governments nonetheless saw it as necessary because banks could not have otherwise found 
strategic partners. 
With the exception of Israel and Poland, governments extended guarantees to depositors in privatised 
banks and to purchasers of state-owned banks, covering various impaired assets and contingent 
liabilities. In many countries, limits on guaranteed deposits were reduced over time and guarantees for 
contingent liabilities were subject to a ceiling.  
As already indicated, the public sector still has a major residual role in many emerging market banking 
systems, in particular in large economies such as China, India and Russia. Expectations expressed in 
Hawkins and Mihaljek (2001) that this role would diminish relatively quickly have proved to be overly 
optimistic. Outside of central Europe, Mexico, Hong Kong and Singapore, policymakers in many 
countries apparently still see a useful role for state-owned commercial banks, not just in serving 
customers in remote areas or certain types of customers (farmers, small firms), but more generally, as 
necessary for socio-economic development. In view of the strong conclusions reached in the empirical 
literature on the inefficiency of using state ownership of banks as a social and development tool, why 
such perceptions are still held remains an open question. As discussed below, one reason might be 
that the remaining state-owned commercial banks have been subjected to greater market discipline 
and have become less inefficient than in the past. 
Consolidation 
In the late 1990s, the banking systems of many emerging market economies were highly fragmented 
in terms of the number and size of institutions, ownership patterns, profitability and competitiveness, 
use of modern technology, and other structural features. Very often, three or four large commercial 
banks coexisted with a large number of smaller urban and rural banks, many of them family-owned 
(especially in Asia) or under the influence of the public sector (as in Latin America and central 
Europe). In general, few commercial banks, even larger ones, were listed on a stock exchange. 
Profitability varied widely, with some banks earning high gross returns but operating very inefficiently, 
and others competing fiercely for a narrow segment of the market. Likewise, while some banks used 
advanced technology and financial innovation, many were still struggling with basic operations such as 
credit risk assessment and liquidity management. 
In this environment, bank mergers were considered to be a potentially important vehicle for improving 
the structure and efficiency of the banking industry. They were expected to derive both cost reductions 
(from economies of scale, improved organisational efficiency, lower cost of funding, greater risk 
diversification, and economising on capital) and revenue gains (by exploiting economies of scope, 
making large deals possible, etc). In many crisis-hit countries, mergers and acquisitions were seen as 
an exit strategy for weak banks; while in others, officials wanted domestic banks to be large enough to 
compete with foreign entrants. 
The drive towards consolidation has continued. The number of mergers and acquisitions has declined 
since 2000, but only slightly. As shown in Table 3, during 2000-04 there were 99 M&A deals between 
domestic institutions and 45 deals between domestic and foreign-owned institutions. The 
corresponding figures for 1995-99 were 108 and 31 deals, respectively. In addition, domestic banks 
from Hungary, Malaysia and Singapore acquired a total of 11 banks abroad during 2000-04; while 
subsidiaries of foreign-owned banks in Colombia, Hungary, the Philippines and Turkey were involved 
in a total of eight mergers and acquisitions in these host and other countries. Moreover, the total value 
of assets of institutions merged since 2000 now exceeds USD 270 billion, compared with USD 170 billion 
in the second half of the 1990s. One should note that the figures on the value of mergers do not 
include data for several countries with significant M&A activities, such as the Czech Republic, Hong 
Kong SAR, Poland, Russia and Turkey. 
The largest numbers of deals were completed in Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Poland and Russia. By 
far the biggest deals involved Mexican banks, followed by Thai, Korean and Philippine banks. Mergers 
and acquisitions in Poland and Russia have involved mostly smaller banks. In central Europe, merger 
                                                                                                                                                                       
exception to the lack of transparency about costs and benefits of bank rescues is the Czech Republic - Barta and Singer (in 
this volume) calculate costs of both bank crises and delays in privatisation. 48  BIS Papers No 28
activity was strong in both periods. During the 1990s, however, this activity was mostly domestic; while 
since 2000, many mergers and acquisitions have also involved domestic and foreign banks, reflecting 
merger activity among parent banks from the European Union. Despite numerous mergers and 
acquisitions, the number of commercial banks in Indonesia and central Europe remains large (see 
Appendix Graph A1). 
Table 3 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in commercial banking sectors 
1995-99 2000-04 
Type of M&A 
Country  Number of 
M&As 
Value   
(USD m)
1  Country  Number of 
M&As 






























































































































































































Total   6  920    8  6,860 
All M&A activities    152  173,310    163  277,430 
1  Value of assets of merged institutions, rounded up to the nearest USD 10 million.   
2 Acquisition by domestic institutions of 
banks in other countries.   
3  Acquisition by foreign-owned institutions in host country of banks in host and other countries. 
Source: Central banks (BIS questionnaire). BIS Papers No 28  49
 
Mergers in Latin America, central Europe and Hong Kong seem to have been by and large market-
driven. This is evident from central bank responses to the BIS questionnaire. The central bank, the 
supervisory authorities and the competition authorities in these countries generally have a neutral 
stance vis-à-vis mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector, which are considered to be private 
business deals. The authorities fulfil their respective duties if financial institutions apply for registration 
of such deals by considering, among others, standard industrial organisation criteria to assess the 
impact on competition and concentration in the banking industry. However, the authorities take a 
neutral stance towards the broader impact of such deals on financial market development and the 
economy - market forces are presumed to work, and the satisfaction of standard prudential and 
competition criteria is regarded as sufficient to assure favourable effects on the market and fiscal 
development. 
By contrast, in many Asian countries (including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand), 
mergers and acquisitions have been more or less actively promoted by the authorities. The Thai 
approach is illustrative in this respect (see the paper by Bank of Thailand in this volume). Since 
January 2004, the Bank of Thailand has, together with the finance ministry, started to implement the 
Financial Sector Master Plan, a medium-term development plan for Thailand’s financial sector. The 
purpose of this plan is to develop a “competitive, efficient, stable, and balanced financial system, 
capable of servicing both sophisticated and unsophisticated users”. One of the key policies under the 
plan is a new licensing regime, which foresees only two types of deposit-taking institutions - 
commercial banks and retail banks - in lieu of the current four. In line with this new regime, existing 
financial institutions have to apply for a change in their licensing status. For instance, finance 
companies or real estate (credit foncier) companies may merge with one another to become 
commercial banks; if they do not wish to merge, they can submit an application to become retail banks 
on their own. In Indonesia, where bank mergers have also been actively encouraged, there has been 
little dynamism in M&A activity so far, partly because owners of small banks have been reluctant to 
give up ownership without special incentives (see the paper by Goeltom in this volume). 
Singapore has pursued a different, facilitative approach. Recognising that increasing globalisation of 
financial markets and cross-border competition offered Singapore the opportunity to become an Asian 
financial hub, the authorities launched a phased opening-up of the domestic financial market in 1999. 
The policy involved encouraging the local banks to engage in mergers and takeovers in a bid to 
realise economies of scale, as well as to strengthen their capability to invest in technology and 
management systems and to attract talent. However, the authorities did not seek to influence the 
outcome of mergers and takeovers, letting the new configuration be determined by market forces. 
How effective the different approaches to consolidation will in the end prove to be remains to be seen. 
So far, there have been no unintended consequences of either the neutral or the more active stance 
vis-à-vis bank consolidation. A key reason might be that issues of excessive concentration have not 
yet arisen in emerging market banking industries.
7 By and large, central banks and other authorities 
have not yet seen an increase in market concentration resulting from domestic bank mergers sufficient 
to raise concerns about market competition. However, concerns have emerged about increased 
regional concentration of banks’ activities in some countries. Moreover, as will be discussed in Section 
3, cross-border mergers among large institutions that own subsidiaries in emerging market countries 
with an already large presence of foreign-owned banks could bring such issues to the fore of the policy 
agenda in the near future. 
2.  Impact on financial intermediation 
At the time of the Deputy Governors meeting in 2000, the impact of structural changes in the banking 
industry on financial intermediation could not yet be discerned. Growth of bank credit to the private 
sector was weak in most countries and falling sharply in those that had experienced a banking crisis in 
the late 1990s. Newly established domestic and foreign-owned banks were in many cases in the midst 
                                                       
7   One concentration issue that has arisen in a number of countries is provision of non-bank financial services by commercial 
banks. In Israel, for instance, commercial banks have typically been advisers to and providers of mutual funds, putting them 
into conflict of interest situations. In 2005, the authorities required the banks to divest such non-banking activities (see the 
paper by Sokoler in this volume). In many central and eastern European countries, commercial banks own leasing 
companies, which provide increasing amounts of credit to consumers.  50  BIS Papers No 28
of restructuring and were reluctant to extend credit to customers other than large corporations or the 
government. Intermediation margins were very wide, and lending to households and small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) was largely absent. In many emerging market countries 
policymakers complained about “cherry-picking” by foreign-owned banks, and some even lamented 
the diminishing role of state-owned banks, which were seen as key providers of credit to small firms 
and households. They also referred to evidence that lending by state-owned commercial banks was 
less procyclical than lending by private domestic and foreign-owned banks.  
Graph 3 
Credit growth and bank ownership 
As a percentage of GDP 
 
  Source: National data (BIS questionnaire). 
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Since late 2000 there has been a sea change in the bank lending landscape, so much so that 
policymakers in many emerging market countries have started to worry about - and in several cases 
seek to limit - too rapid growth of bank credit to the private sector, and in particular to households. The 
factors explaining the resurgence of private sector credit are discussed in the paper by Mohanty et al 
in this volume. This section will focus on the evolving composition of private sector credit and bank 
performance by different types of banks (state-owned, private domestic, foreign-owned), rather than 
on the performance and impact of banking systems as a whole. 
Impact on bank lending 
Graph 3 assesses how far banks with different ownership structures have participated in the process 
of financial deepening observed over the past 10 years. Points in this graph match total commercial 
bank credit as a percentage of GDP in 1994, 1999 and 2004, with the corresponding shares of state-
owned, domestic and foreign-owned bank lending (as a percentage of GDP) for 14 emerging market 
economies for which data were available. Over the past 10 years, private domestic banks have 
participated in total credit expansion to a considerably greater extent than either foreign- or state-
owned banks: for every 10 percentage point increase in the credit to GDP ratio, credit extended by 
private domestic banks has expanded on average by 8% of GDP, while the share of foreign-owned 
banks has increased by about 1½% of GDP, and that of state-owned banks by less than half a 
percentage point. 
Over the past five years, however, foreign-owned banks have expanded lending more rapidly than 
private domestic banks in several countries, including Chile, Korea and Mexico (Graph 4). In Brazil, by 
contrast, the share of foreign-owned banks stabilised at about 20% of total loans and their role in the 
domestic banking system has not grown, as private domestic banks seemed more capable of profiting 
from the growing domestic market. Private domestic banks also led the credit expansion in this period 
in Argentina, Colombia and Hungary. The contrast in lending by different types of banks is particularly 
stark in the case of Mexico, where foreign-owned banks expanded credit fivefold, while credit by 
private domestic banks contracted by almost 50% during 2000-04. Turkey is one of the few examples 
of state-owned banks dominating credit expansion in recent years.
8 
Graph 4 
Cumulative growth of bank credit, 2000-04 
Per cent, in real terms 
 
  Sources: IMF; national data (BIS questionnaire). 
Further insights can be obtained from the data on the composition of bank lending (Table 4 and Graph 5). 
Focusing first on credit to the government, it is interesting that, on average, both state- and foreign-
owned banks increased their lending to the government relative to lending to other sectors between 
1999 and 2004, in particular in Argentina, Colombia and Turkey (state-owned banks) and Argentina, 
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Colombia, Hungary, Korea, Mexico and Thailand (foreign-owned banks). While fiscal dominance 
seems a plausible explanation for the increased lending by state-owned banks (especially in Argentina 
and Turkey, which experienced crises in 2001), why foreign-owned banks would increase lending to 







2 Corporate  Household 
  1999 2004 1999 2004 1999 2004 
Korea 6.3  4.9  76.1 58.6 15.6 36.5 
Argentina   35.8  77.4  31.0 9.7  33.2  12.8 
Chile 0.1  0.4  53.2 47.9 46.7 51.7 
Colombia 20.0  50.6  44.5 34.3 35.5 15.1 
Hungary   49.4  30.4  48.4 30.4  2.2 39.3 
Turkey   30.3  65.2  64.9 27.7  4.8  7.1 
Israel 34.7  33.9 52.1 52.7 13.1 
13.4 
 
Average 25.2  37.5  52.9 37.3 21.6 25.1 
Private domestic banks 
Korea 8.4  5.2  61.1 42.7 30.5 52.2 
Thailand 4.5  4.9  68.1 66.9 27.4 28.2 
Argentina   25.6  64.8  32.2 18.4 42.2 16.8 
Chile 1.0  0.6  64.0 66.6 35.0 32.8 
Colombia 14.4  30.7  62.2 55.6 23.4 13.7 
Mexico 45.4  23.6  33.0 56.2 21.6 20.2 
Hungary   39.2  18.8  36.9 29.7 23.9 51.4 
Turkey   27.2  22.6  64.2 60.6  8.5 16.9 
Israel 10.8  7.2  89.2 92.8  9.0 18.2 
Average 21.0  21.7  56.2 55.9 23.9 24.8 
Foreign-owned banks 
Korea 8.1  23.1  75.2 41.2 16.8 35.7 
Thailand 5.6  13.0  89.7 75.0  4.7 13.0 
Argentina   26.2  60.1  45.5 25.9 28.3 13.9 
Chile 1.6  1.4  86.0 73.6 12.4 24.9 
Colombia 9.5  32.6  73.7 47.6 16.8 19.8 
Mexico 36.3  55.2  51.1 22.7 12.7 22.0 
Hungary   14.2  14.6  80.5 65.1  6.4 20.3 
Turkey   59.2  15.8  38.4 57.2  2.4 27.0 
Average 20.1  27.0  67.5 51.0 12.6 22.1 
1  As a percentage of total credit, excluding interbank credit.   
2  Net claims on the government for most countries. 
Source: Central banks (BIS questionnaire). 
 BIS Papers No 28  53
 
Graph 5 
Change in the composition of lending between 1999 and 2004 




















Source: National data (BIS questionnaire). 
The share of loans to the corporate sector declined in all three types of banks in almost all countries 
between 1999 and 2004, with the largest average declines occurring for state- and foreign-owned 
banks. The exceptions are few: Chile, Israel, Mexico (private domestic banks) and Turkey (foreign-
owned banks). Much of this decline is healthy, reflecting deleveraging by large firms and diversification 
of their sources of finance (to corporate bonds, equity and, in some cases, borrowing from banks 
abroad). Data for countries in central Europe indicate, for instance, a strong increase in lending to 
SMEs in recent years, which in several countries rivals lending to households in terms of the pace of 
credit expansion. Some of the decline in corporate lending also reflects post-crisis risk aversion and 
balance sheet repair on the part of banks.  
The most significant change in the composition of bank lending in the last five years has been a shift 
towards lending to households. Foreign-owned banks in particular have offset the large decline in the 
share of corporate loans (by 17 percentage points) with a rise in the share of household loans in total 
loans. Even state-owned banks increased lending to households between 1999 and 2004 (with the 
exception of Argentina and Colombia). The increase in the share of loans to households has been 
most pronounced in Hungary, Korea and Turkey. 
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Comparing the composition of loans across banks, household loans accounted for roughly one quarter 
of total lending for all three types of banks in 2004 (Table 4). The big differences are in lending to 
corporations and the government. Private domestic banks lend mostly to the corporate sector (60% on 
average) and relatively little to the government (with the exception of Argentina, 15% on average). For 
state-owned banks, government and corporate loan portfolios are on average of the same size. 
Foreign-owned banks also lend primarily to the corporate sector, but unlike private domestic banks, 
the government accounts for over a quarter of their loan book; moreover, with the exception of Chile, 
Hungary and Turkey, this share has increased significantly since 1999. 
These differences in the composition of loans probably reflect the different business strategies, risk 
attitudes and histories of state-owned, private domestic and foreign-owned banks. Today’s state-
owned banks for the most part inherited a large portfolio of loans to the public sector and corporations, 
including in several countries not just large corporations but also SMEs, which are supported by 
various government credit schemes (Mihaljek (2004)). Initially, they did not lend much to households, 
except in some cases under subsidised housing schemes. But over time, as competitive pressures 
have increased and state-owned banks have become more business- and profit-oriented, they have 
increasingly turned to the household sector, in many countries providing both consumer and housing 
loans. Korea and Hungary are clear examples in this respect. Nonetheless, state-owned banks still 
lend disproportionately to the government. From a governance point of view, one might argue that the 
lack of independence of state-owned banks from their owners is similar to connected lending practices 
in the private sector, with similar risks to profitability and soundness, and in principle would have to be 
sanctioned as such by independent supervisory authorities. 
Private domestic banks, on the other hand, emerged from the crises and restructuring of the late 
1990s holding portfolios that consisted mainly of corporate loans (about 60%) and roughly equal 
proportions of claims on the government and the household sector. As macroeconomic conditions 
improved, they shifted their business towards households to a greater extent and more quickly than 
did state-owned banks. The fall in corporate lending shares also reflects an overextension of corporate 
lending in the past. As a result, both supply side (a pullback of banks from corporate lending) and 
demand side factors (weak corporate borrowing) have been at play.  
Russia’s experience is particularly interesting in this regard. A few years ago foreign-owned banks 
accounted for only 5% of total bank loans in Russia (including cross-border loans); in 2005, the figure 
had risen to 40%. The main customers of foreign banks have become big Russian exporters, which 
used to be serviced by large domestic banks in the past. These domestic banks have reoriented their 
lending towards SMEs, which used to be serviced by medium-sized banks in the past. These banks, in 
turn, have reoriented lending towards households, which used to be served by small banks. As a 
result of this domino effect, many small banks are being taken over or closed. 
Foreign-owned banks that entered emerging markets by buying local state-owned banks also inherited 
a large portfolio of loans to the government and the corporate sector. Like private domestic banks, 
these foreign-owned banks initially focused on the corporate sector (see the paper by Pruski and 
Zochowski in this volume). Other foreign banks, which entered emerging markets either as greenfield 
operations or by buying local mid-sized state-owned banks, were from the start more oriented towards 
households. As the financial position of large firms strengthened over time and many of them started 
to issue bonds and equity, foreign-owned banks that serviced them also started to turn to the 
household sector in search of higher margins. And as competition in consumer and housing credit 
markets has intensified, foreign-owned banks in some countries - in particular in central Europe - have 
turned to the next underserved segment of the market: SMEs. More recently, larger corporations in 
countries such as Hungary and Mexico have again begun to borrow from domestic banks, partly 
because the banks are offering them new types of loans at lower interest rates, including foreign 
currency loans. The development cycle of different loan products has thus turned full circle in some 
countries and a new cycle has begun. 
Impact on bank efficiency 
In the wake of the emerging market banking crises of the 1990s, a growing number of studies have 
found evidence that foreign bank entry tends to benefit the host country.
9 It has been argued in 
                                                       
9   See eg Claessens et al (2001) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001). BIS Papers No 28  55
 
particular that foreign bank entry may stimulate competition in the banking industry, leading to higher 
efficiency for domestic banks, and result in improvements in the quality and accessibility of financial 
services for host country firms and individuals. Data provided by central banks for this meeting confirm 
that structural changes in emerging market banking systems have generally led to an improvement in 
standard prudential and efficiency indicators over the past five years. However, it has not been 
possible to assess improvements in the quality and accessibility of financial services. 
The average share of non-performing loans (NPLs) in total loans declined significantly for all types of 
banks between 1999 and 2004 (Table 5). The largest improvements were on average achieved by 
state-owned banks. Israel is the only country where there was an increase in the share of NPLs for all 
three bank categories. Other exceptions are Hungary and Venezuela for state-owned banks and 
Turkey for private domestic banks. The improvement in NPL ratios has been fairly uniform across 











1999 2004 1999 2004 1999 2004 1999 2004 
Argentina   23.4  13.7  13.6  12.5 12.0  7.1  16.5 11.1 
Chile   1.4  0.8  1.7  1.1 1.8  1.5  1.7 1.2 
Colombia   22.8  3.5  7.1 3.8 7.3  2.1  10.0 3.4 
Mexico   …  …  10.8  1.2 2.2  2.2  9.2 2.1 
Venezuela   24.0  29.5  6.2  1.6 5.1  0.7  6.1 1.7 
China
2 22.4  15.6  12.0  4.9  …  …  …  … 
India  16.0 8.1  10.3 5.9 7.2  4.9  14.6 7.4 
Korea  15.0 1.9 8.7 2.0 20.6  1.6  11.4  1.9 
Thailand   55.3  9.6  21.6  12.8 7.5  2.6  31.2  10.9 
Hungary 4.3  17.6  4.4  2.0 3.7  2.9  3.9 3.5 
Turkey   11.3  11.4  3.8  5.1 2.4  3.3  6.1 6.4 
Israel   4.9  6.5  0.6 3.5  … …  1.7 4.2 
Average 18.3  10.7  8.4  4.7 7.0  2.9  10.2 4.9 
1  As a percentage of total loans.   
2  Based on five-tier classification. Data for private domestic banks are for joint stock 
commercial banks. 
Source: Central banks (BIS questionnaire); IMF. 
 
One should note that much of this improvement probably reflects the business cycle and is not 
necessarily the result of different behaviour of representative bank categories. In addition, many 
banks, in particular state-owned ones and those that were sold to foreign strategic investors, unloaded 
a significant portion of their NPL portfolios to asset management companies and other vehicles for 
resolution of bank distress. This is partly confirmed by central bank answers to the questionnaire on 
guarantees offered to buyers of privatised banks (see Table 2 above). Nevertheless, there seems to 
have been some structural improvement in NPLs, as the 2004 NPL ratios shown in Table 5 are 
generally below those observed during the previous cyclical upturn in the mid-1990s (cf Hawkins and 
Mihaljek (2001)).  
Provisioning against loan losses has also risen significantly (Graph 6). Banks in most countries had 
set aside provisions for at least two thirds of NPLs at end-2004; in Chile, Korea, Mexico and Saudi 
Arabia cover exceeded 100% of NPLs. Cover seems relatively low only in central Europe, India, 
Malaysia and Venezuela, and these provisioning ratios are in many cases considerably higher than 
prior to the crisis in the mid-1990s (in the case of Turkey, prior to 2001). 56  BIS Papers No 28
Graph 6 
Total provisions against loan losses, 
as a percentage of NPLs 
 
  Sources: Central banks; IMF 
Capital adequacy has generally improved for state-owned banks, and has stayed relatively high for 
private domestic and foreign-owned banks (Table 6). With risk-adjusted capital/asset ratios (capital 
adequacy ratios) of around 32-37%, state-owned banks in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Thailand and 
Turkey are probably overcapitalised while those in China, with an adjusted CAR of below 7% in 2004, 
are clearly undercapitalised. In Korea and the Czech Republic, foreign-owned banks have reduced 
capital adequacy ratios that were perhaps unsustainably high for a competitive banking environment 
to more normal levels. In most other countries, including India and Turkey, private banks have either 
increased or maintained relatively high levels of capital adequacy. Again, these levels compare 
favourably with capital adequacy ratios from pre-banking crisis periods. 
Structural changes have also had a visible impact on bank profitability, as measured by returns on 
assets and equity. State-owned banks in particular have significantly improved both their return on 
assets (Appendix Table A1) and their return on equity (Appendix Table A2) since 1999, as well as with 
respect to the mid-1990s. Improvements in these indicators were also pronounced for private domestic 
banks in Colombia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Saudi Arabia and Thailand. For instance, in 
2004 the return on equity of private domestic banks in Colombia, Hungary and Venezuela exceeded 
30% and the return on assets exceeded 3%, with banks in Saudi Arabia realising slightly lower but still 
fairly high returns. The improvement since 1999 has been less pronounced for foreign-owned banks, 
whose profitability was already somewhat higher in 1999 than that of private domestic banks. In 
Argentina, profitability of foreign-owned banks declined drastically after the 2001 crisis. 
Changes in net interest income and other income have been less pronounced. State-owned and 
private domestic banks generally increased net interest income relative to total assets between 1999 
and 2004 (Appendix Graph A2). But for foreign-owned banks net interest income ratios were either 
constant or declined in most countries, reflecting the narrowing of interest rate margins brought about 
by greater competition. In Hungary, Turkey, Colombia and Venezuela, net interest income ratios for 
most banks exceeded 4% in 2004, suggesting that intermediation margins were still quite high. In 
Hungary, Turkey and Venezuela, high interest margins in addition partly reflected relatively high real 



























































1999 2004 1999 2004 1999 2004 1999 2004 
Argentina 16.5 9.1  31.5  16.3 16.3 11.9 19.7 12.3 
Chile   13.3  10.1  11.4  12.0 15.4 16.7 13.5 13.6 
Colombia
2   9.1  8.3  11.7  11.1 12.0 11.1 11.2 10.7 
Mexico   …  …  16.4  17.8 14.6 13.2 16.0 14.1 
Venezuela   15.2  10.9  12.8  12.6 13.6 12.6 13.3 12.5 
China
3  5.4  6.8 …  7.6 … … … … 
India  11.3 13.2 11.9 11.2 10.8 15.0 11.3 12.9 
Korea  9.3 12.5 11.6 11.3 21.9 13.1 12.0 11.8 
Thailand   24.4  31.9  16.3  13.7 13.8 12.1 15.0 13.2 
Czech Rep   …  31.6  11.5  14.0 18.6 12.1 13.6 12.6 
Hungary 24.4  31.9  16.3  13.7 13.8 12.1 15.0 13.2 
Poland  8.8 16.3 12.6 15.1 15.0 15.4 12.4 15.6 
Turkey   11.7  36.8  17.2  22.3 22.5 26.9  7.0 26.2 
Israel   9.6  10.8  9.3  10.7 … …  9.4  10.8 
Average 13.3  13.7  14.7  13.5 15.7 14.4 13.0 13.8 
1  Risk-weighted capital adequacy ratios, in per cent.   
2  Total capital over total assets.   
3  Data refer to end-2001 and June 
2004, respectively. Data on private domestic banks are for joint stock commercial banks. 
Source: Central banks (BIS questionnaire); OECD. 
 
Graph 7 compares sources of income (upper panel) and profits and costs (lower panel) for different 
categories of banks in 2004. With the exception of Argentina, net interest income is still the main 
income source for most banks, regardless of ownership structure. But the share of non-interest income 
is generally higher for foreign-owned banks than for state-owned or private domestic banks, reflecting 
the broader range of products offered by foreign banks. For all three types of banks there has been a 
widespread increase in this share since 1999 (Appendix Graph A2), suggesting an expanding scope 
of financial intermediation as banks have introduced new fee-based products and services. 
Increased competition in the banking industry has also been reflected in generally lower interest rate 
margins. As shown in Graph 8, with the exception of Hong Kong SAR and Turkey, the spread between 
representative bank lending rates and customer deposit rates declined from an average of 
6.1 percentage points in 1999 to 4.1 percentage points in 2004. The narrowing of interest margins has 
been particularly pronounced for state-owned banks, suggesting that large rents were extracted in the 
past from their dominant position in many countries. There has also been a substantial narrowing of 
interest rate margins for foreign banks, with private domestic banks making on average less progress. 
Pre-tax profits have risen in most countries and operating costs have generally declined since 1999 
(Appendix Graph A3), as well as with respect to the mid-1990s. For both profits and costs, the 
magnitude of these improvements has been similar across different types of banks. The absence of 
clear “winners” suggests that increased competition has provided state, private domestic and foreign-
owned banks with roughly equal incentives to improve performance. What differences remain probably 
reflect different starting positions. As shown in the lower panel of Graph 7, foreign-owned banks tend 
to have slightly higher pre-tax profits (2.2% of total assets on average, compared with 1.8% for private 
domestic and state-owned banks), but they also have higher costs (3.9% of total assets, compared 
with 3.2% for domestic banks and 2.6% for state-owned banks). It is not entirely clear what factors 
have contributed to these differences. One reason might be that, compared with foreign banks, state 
banks often own real estate in attractive locations (or rent it at low cost from city authorities), and can 
offer their staff higher state benefits in exchange for somewhat lower salaries. 58  BIS Papers No 28
Graph 7 
 
In sum, several indicators point to a positive impact overall of structural change on bank lending and 
efficiency. The structure of lending has become more diversified, with less credit going to the 
government and large enterprises and more to households and - at least in central Europe - smaller 
enterprises. Banks in emerging market countries have by and large also become financially stronger 
and operationally more efficient. Greater foreign bank participation has helped improve bank 
governance. 
Yet differences between state-owned and other banks still remain. Compared with foreign-owned 
banks, for instance, state-owned banks have generally been slower in diversifying their lending and 
reducing non-performing loans; but have been recapitalised to a greater extent (perhaps excessively 
Net interest and other income, 2004 
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so in some countries), and have done more to improve return on equity/assets and narrow interest 
rate margins, albeit often from worse starting positions.
10 Positive effects of competition on bank 
performance have also been visible in the case of private domestic banks. This is perhaps the most 
significant development, considering that in many countries these banks had to cope with restructuring 
at their own shareholders’ expense, whereas the state-owned banks were typically restructured at 
taxpayers’ expense and subsequently sold to foreign-owned banks, in most cases below the cost of 
restructuring. 
Graph 8 








Source: National data (BIS questionnaire). 
3.   Challenges for market discipline and supervision 
The changing structure of the emerging economies’ banking systems has many implications for 
financial stability and in particular the supervisory regime. This section addresses two specific issues 
that arise in this context: first, supervision of foreign-owned banks; and second, the impact of delisting 
of large domestic banks from local stock exchanges after takeovers by foreign-owned banks. 
The presence of foreign banks has generally led domestic supervisory authorities to upgrade the 
quality and increase the size of their staff in order to supervise the more sophisticated activities and 
new products being introduced by these banks. In addition, supervisory authorities in banking systems 
dominated by foreign-owned banks have had to cooperate with home country supervisory authorities 
to a greater extent. In virtually all countries attending the meeting, domestic supervisory authorities 
have established formal channels of communication with the authorities in charge of financial 
supervision in parent banks’ home countries. In most cases, the framework for cooperation is set out 
in bilateral memoranda of understanding. Areas of cooperation typically cover: exchange of 
information on operations of foreign-owned banks in host and home countries; exchange of 
information on management of foreign-owned banks; and joint consultations and visits to 
foreign-owned banks. Cooperation is generally judged to be smooth, and the main obstacle in 
establishing closer working relationships with foreign supervisory authorities is usually seen to be the 
different legal treatment of confidential data and information in various jurisdictions.  
                                                       
10   One common complaint about foreign banks in Latin America is that their managers have very short time horizons and tend 
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Yet some central banks have expressed more general scepticism about overly legalistic modes of 
communication among supervisors. In practice, the consolidated (home) supervisor has tended to 
dominate the host country supervisor even in the case of subsidiaries. Moreover, comments provided 
in the BIS questionnaire suggest that some host country authorities were not always fully informed 
about the situation of parent banks in home countries. One special challenge is governance: foreign-
owned banks are managed from their headquarters from a global perspective, which means that 
different transactions are booked in different banking hubs around the world. As a result, some 
subsidiaries end up with a greater concentration of certain risks than would otherwise be the case. As 
reporting lines for different operations often bypass local managers, central banks in host countries 
might not always be informed in time about issues such as liquidity problems of local subsidiaries. 
Different accounting standards also create problems, in part because they affect the type of business 
activities that foreign banks carry out in host countries. 
Several central banks noted that foreign bank affiliates are often of marginal importance from the 
parent perspective, but might well be systemically important for the host country. One issue that arises 
in this context is what would happen if a foreign-owned subsidiary that was systemically important 
locally ran into problems. One central bank acknowledged that it did not know what parent banks 
would do in such a case. There were cases where a parent company had helped its subsidiary 
immediately, without asking host country authorities for any assistance. But there were also some 
cases of a parent abandoning its subsidiary.
11 The response would seem to depend on financial health 
of the parent - if the parent was in weak shape, it might care less about reputation costs and abandon 
its subsidiary. Another central bank attached less probability to foreign parents abandoning their 
subsidiaries than to foreign owners more generally not acting in the interests of local shareholders. 
A related issue in this context is the possible conversion of systemically important subsidiaries of 
foreign-owned banks into branches. This development has been facilitated in the European Union by 
the adoption of the single EU banking passport. But the issue is more general, as the centralisation of 
the decision-making process in global financial institutions has led to a system in which subsidiaries 
operate more or less like branches anyway.
12 The issue in this case is less whether such systemically 
important branches (or quasi-branches) might be abandoned in a period of distress - legally, branches 
cannot be “abandoned” because claims on the bank stay with the parent - and more how the central 
bank and supervisory authorities in the host country might deal with the loss of liquidity in the domestic 
banking system and disruptions to the payment system if the parent institution decides to close a 
branch that is small for the parent, but systemically important for the host country.  
Developments in the global banking industry are important for market discipline and supervision in 
emerging market host countries for yet another reason: mergers between parent institutions in 
industrial countries might result in a significant increase in concentration in host countries. For 
instance, the merger between Unicredito and HVB has implications for competition in the Polish 
banking market, as these two parents own the second and third largest banks in Poland. As noted 
above, bank consolidation in most emerging economies has not yet been associated with any marked 
rise in concentration, as most mergers have involved smaller banks. But mergers between large 
domestic institutions that reflect merger activity outside the borders of the host country might be harder 
to resist. What could supervisory authorities do in such circumstances if they cannot challenge such 
domestic mergers on legal grounds? 
The delisting of foreign-owned subsidiaries from local stock exchanges raises a different set of 
concerns. Among countries attending the meeting, such delisting has occurred in the Czech Republic, 
Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Mexico and Poland. In the Czech Republic, it involved one institution with a 
12% share in market capitalisation; in Hong Kong, one very small bank; in Korea, two institutions with 
a 0.8% share in total market capitalisation each; and in Poland, three institutions with a combined 
share in stock market capitalisation of 5%.  
Delisting has been by far the biggest issue in Mexico (see the paper by Sidaoui in this volume). During 
2000-05, five of the largest institutions in Mexico, representing 77% of total bank assets, were 
                                                       
11   One well known case is that of Riječka banka, Croatia’s third largest bank, in which a currency trader caused losses of 
nearly USD 100 million, or three quarters of the bank’s capital, in 2002. Germany’s Bayerische Landesbank decided to sell 
its 59% share in the bank for a symbolic price of USD 1 to the Croatian government when the losses were discovered. The 
government subsequently sold the bank to Austria’s Erste Bank for EUR 55 million plus a capital increase. 
12   See CGFS (2004, 2005) and Domanski (2005). BIS Papers No 28  61
 
acquired by foreign-owned banks (foreign-owned banks now account for 82% of the country’s total 
bank assets). All of these five institutions were subsequently delisted from the Mexican stock 
exchange, leading to a significant loss of market prices and scrutiny by independent analysts. 
Moreover, as these banks represented 15% of total stock market capitalisation at the time of 
acquisition (11% at the time of delisting), their delisting affected the development of the Mexican 
capital market more generally. Even though supervisors required subsidiaries to report as if they were 
listed, that information did not benefit the local market. In addition, the disclosure of timely and 
meaningful information about developments in institutions accounting for close to 80% of Mexico’s 
banking sector was impaired, making it necessary to significantly improve information flows from 
parent banks to markets, and from home supervisors to host authorities. The delistings also raise 
broader questions about financial and corporate development in emerging market economies and 
possible policy responses.  62  BIS Papers No 28
Appendix 
Graph A1 
Number of commercial banks 
 
Source: National data (BIS questionnaire). 
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Table A1 
Return on assets 







1999 2004 1999 2004 1999 2004 1999 2004 
Argentina –0.1  0.3  1.4  1.1 –0.1  –3.0  0.2  –0.5 
Chile   0.7  0.5  0.5  1.5  0.8 1.3 0.7 1.2 
Colombia –14.5  3.0  –0.2  3.5 –1.4  2.4  –3.7  3.2 
Mexico   …  …  1.8  1.0  0.7 1.1 1.5 1.1 
Venezuela   0.7  1.5  2.6  4.2  3.5 4.9 2.9 4.2 
China  0.1  0.3  …  …  … … … … 
India 0.4  1.1  0.7  1.0  0.9 1.6 0.5 1.1 
Korea –3.7  1.9  –0.0  0.7 –1.0  0.6  –1.2  0.8 
Thailand   …  …  –6.0  1.2 –0.2  2.3  –5.2  1.4 
Czech Rep   …  0.9  –1.0  0.4 0.7  1.4  –0.3  1.3 
Hungary 0.6  2.5  1.5  3.7  0.1 1.7 0.5 2.4 
Poland 1.1  1.8  2.0  0.5  1.2 1.4 1.4 2.0 
Turkey   1.1  2.5  4.3  1.6 5.4  2.3  –0.7  2.1 
Israel   0.5  0.6  0.6  0.7  …  … 0.6 0.7 
Saudi Arabia   ...  …  1.7  2.7  …  … 1.7 2.7 
Average
1  –1.3 1.5  0.7 1.7  1.0 0.9  –0.1 1.9 
1  Excluding Argentina. 




Return on equity 







1999 2004 1999 2004 1999 2004 1999 2004 
Argentina –1.3  3.6 6.9  8.4 –0.8  –30.3 1.9  –4.9 
Chile   12.9  12.1  9.6  21.0 8.6  14.0  9.4  16.7 
Colombia –159.0  36.3  –1.5 31.1  –11.9  21.3 –32.5 29.9 
Mexico   …  …  17.6  11.9 10.5  12.4  16.3  12.3 
Venezuela   4.3  13.7  20.2  32.7 26.0  38.7  21.7  34.0 
India 8.5  20.9  12.5  16.3 9.9  15.4  9.2  19.3 
Singapore …  …  10.5  13.5  …  …  10.5  13.5 
Korea –60.1  29.6  –0.5  15.0 –7.8  11.2  –17.5  16.5 
Czech Rep   …  14.9  –16.8  9.6 9.8  25.1  –4.3  23.4 
Hungary 4.0  19.1  27.2  41.2 1.2  22.7  6.3  28.5 
Poland 18.7  27.3  19.5  8.5 13.7  16.9  16.3  18.3 
Turkey   27.6  26.6  33.2  10.3 44.9  –61.9 –14.0 14.0 
Israel   10.5  11.4  11.8 11.6  …  …  11.3 13.2 
Saudi Arabia   …  …  15.8  26.2  …  …  15.8  26.2 
Average
1   –14.7 21.2  12.2  19.1  10.5 11.6  3.7  20.4 
1  Excluding Argentina. 
Source: Central banks (BIS questionnaire). 64  BIS Papers No 28
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